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This article takes stock of German foreign policy during Angela Merkel’s third term in office 
(2013-2017). It argues that the longer-term significance of Germany’s foreign policy during 
this period is twofold. First, the Merkel government was confronted with multiple European 
and international crises which worked as a magnifying glass for the growing international 
expectations on Germany to become more actively engaged on the international stage. 
Second, the tenure of the Grand Coalition saw a significant shift in the German domestic 
foreign policy discourse that was marked by a concerted effort of leading decision-makers to 
make the case for Germany to accept greater international responsibilities. This emerging 
consensus among foreign policy elites expresses a changed self-conception of German 
foreign policy which, however, continues to be viewed with scepticism in the broader public. 
Informed by such a broad two-level perspective that focuses on the interplay between 
international and domestic expectations on German foreign policy, the article explores the 
record of the Grand Coalition in the main international crises it had to engage with. It 
suggests that the Merkel government was better able to live up to its own aspirations in two-





The foreign policy agenda of the third Merkel government was dominated by multiple 
economic, political, diplomatic and military crises in Europe and the broader international 
environment. The ongoing Eurocrisis, the conflicts in Eastern Ukraine and Syria, the so-
called refugee crisis as well as the uncertain trajectories of European integration and 
transatlantic relations after the British vote to leave the European Union (EU) (‘Brexit’) and 
the election of Donald Trump as US President are the most critical cases in point. In the 
words of Germany’s then foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier (2014a, 8), having to 
respond to such crises became the ‘permanent condition’ of German foreign policy. Viewed 
from the outside, Germany often was the ‘indispensable power’ (Bulmer and Paterson 2016, 
44) in international efforts at crisis management.  
On the domestic level, the third term in office of Chancellor Merkel was marked by a 
significant shift in the German foreign policy discourse. The most notable expression of that 
shift was how leading German decision-makers including President Joachim Gauck (2013, 
2014) and foreign minister Steinmeier (2014b) acknowledged the increased responsibilities of 
Germany on the international stage. At the same time, the German public remained largely 
sceptical towards the self-declared ambition of the Grand Coalition to play a bigger part in 
international politics that matched Germany’s status as a ‘major European power’ 
(Steinmeier 2016, 106). For the Merkel government, foreign policy thus remained a difficult 
balancing act between international and domestic expectations. In this two-level constellation 
(Putnam 1988), the Grand Coalition stepped up the efforts to overcome domestic reservations 
about Germany taking over more responsibilities in international politics and to prepare the 
ground for a more active German foreign policy. 
The article develops this argument as follows. It begins with sketching out the background to 
the growing international demands on German foreign policy. The article then traces the main 
 
 
shifts in Germany’s domestic foreign policy discourse during the Grand Coalition. Against 
that background, the discussion explores some of the main challenges for German foreign 
policy in this period, focusing on the Eurocrisis and Brexit, the conflicts in Eastern Ukraine 
and Syria, the refugee crisis and the transatlantic relationship. 
 
International Expectations on German Foreign Policy 
The Grand Coalition took office at a time when German foreign policy was widely criticised 
in the international arena. In many places, Germany was seen as a ‘free rider’ that takes 
advantage of the international order and stability which its partners provide without making 
adequate contributions itself (Hyde-Price 2015, 601-602). This view was driven, not least, by 
judgements about the foreign policy of the second Merkel government between CDU/CSU 
and FDP (2009-2013) which was widely seen on the international stage to indicate the 
absence of strategic direction and a neglect of Germany’s international responsibilities (Grant 
2014). The prime exhibit for that view was Germany’s abstention in the UN Security Council 
vote on Resolution 1973 on Libya in March 2011 which put Germany against all three of its 
main international partners, the US, France and the UK, who supported the resolution and 
were the main drivers behind it. Germany’s position was widely criticised in the Western 
alliance and partly seen to indicate a move of German foreign policy towards isolationism 
and the turning away from its long-standing partners (Oppermann and Spencer 2016).  
The backdrop of such reservations and uncertainties reinforced international demands on the 
Grand Coalition to involve itself stronger in international affairs. On one hand, Germany 
moved into the spotlight of international expectations to show leadership in European and 
international crises due to a perceived lack of alternatives. While France had lost some of its 
international standing as a result of its economic weakness (Bulmer and Paterson 2013, 1392-
1396), British foreign policy was increasingly preoccupied with the implications of the Brexit 
 
 
referendum (Whitman 2016, 522-524). At the same time, the Obama administration sought to 
pivot US foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific and to delegate the responsibility for 
European crisis management to its transatlantic partners (Brands 2016). The Trump 
administration, in turn, appears to take a purely transactional view on the transatlantic 
partnership making it contingent on the willingness of its European partners to shoulder a 
larger part of the burden for European security. All this fed into a growing sense of an 
international leadership vacuum which German foreign policy was expected to fill.  
For many, Germany was predestined for this role because of its standing as Europe’s 
strongest economy. While other European countries still suffered from the aftereffects of the 
financial crisis, the German economy got out of this crisis relatively well (Matthijs 2016, 
136-138). In comparison to many of its European partners, Germany also looked like an 
island of political stability that came to be symbolised by the long period in office of 
Chancellor Merkel. Importantly, the long-standing international reservations against 
Germany turning its economic and political strength into a more active foreign policy have 
also for the most part evaporated. From the perspective of its international partners, 
Germany’s history is ever less seen as a legitimate reason for German restraint in 
international politics (GIZ 2015, 80-81). To the contrary, the image of contemporary 
Germany abroad carries mainly positive connotations. For example, Germany ranks close to 
the top in studies on the ‘soft’ power resources of countries worldwide. These rankings 
reflect a sense of cultural attractiveness of Germany as well as the perceived legitimacy and 
moral authority of its foreign policy (Crossley-Frolick 2016, 6-7). In the ‘Nation Brands 
Index’ of the Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (GfK), a market research institute, which 
maps many facets of country images in international public opinion, Germany came in 
second, behind the US, in 2015 and 2016 (GfK 2016). Germany’s high international esteem 
is also being projected on Angela Merkel personally who enjoys higher levels of trust and 
 
 
confidence in international opinion polls than other heads of government (Pew Research 
Center 2017).  
In this way, the third Merkel government saw a continuation of the longer-term trend over the 
course of which the international weight of expectations on German foreign policy ever more 
increased. This reflects both the strength of Germany and the weakness of others. In any case, 
German foreign policy was pushed into an international leadership role more than it had 
actively sought such a role (Steinmeier 2016, 106).  
 
The Domestic Foreign Policy Discourse 
For the domestic discourse around Germany’s place in the world, the third Merkel 
government marks an important watershed. At the centre of this were a range of coordinated 
speeches by President Joachim Gauck and different cabinet members which argued that 
Germany should pursue a more active foreign policy and take on more international 
responsibilities. These speeches expressed a changed self-conception of German foreign 
policy and signalled the wish for a foreign policy restart after the much-criticised record of 
the second Merkel government (Hyde-Price 2015, 602-605). The message to Germany’s 
international partners was that German foreign policy recognises their demands to take on a 
fairer share of the burden for international stability and security as legitimate and is willing to 
meet expectations for stronger German contributions. In the domestic arena, the speeches 
were meant to prepare a sceptical public for a more active role of Germany in international 
politics. 
The domestic debate around Germany’s responsibilities in international politics was initiated 
by a speech of President Joachim Gauck (2013) to mark the Day of German Unity on 3 
October 2013. In this speech, Gauck raised the question whether Germany’s ‘[international] 
engagement [was] on a par with the weight that our country carries’ and argued against ‘the 
 
 
idea that Germany plays itself down to eschew risks or solidarity’. Germany would have to 
‘adjust to taking on more responsibility’ (Gauck 2013). Similar points were made in speeches 
by Joachim Gauck (2014), foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (2014b, 2015) and 
defence minister Ursula von der Leyen (2014) at the Munich Security Conference in 2014 
and 2015. Overall, these (and other) contributions to the German foreign policy debate 
presented a largely similar line of argument that rested on four pillars. 
First, the speeches emphasised how Germany was immediately affected by conflicts and 
upheavals in its international environment because it ‘is more interconnected in and with the 
world than almost any other’ country in the world (Steinmeier 2015). The discourse 
highlighted Germany’s vulnerability to international crises and the threat of international 
instability for its security: 
Our country is not an island. We should not cherish the illusion that we will be spared 
from political and economic, environmental and military conflicts if we do not 
contribute to solving them (Gauck 2013). 
Germany ‘benefits more than most from an open world order’ (Gauck 2014) and has to ‘rely 
on a rule-based international order and adherence to the regulations more than any other state’ 
(Steinmeiner 2015). Upholding such an order therefore stands out as Germany’s ‘most 
important foreign policy goal in the 21st century’ (Gauck 2014). In the face of an 
increasingly fragile international environment, ‘to sit and wait is not an option’ for Germany 
(von der Leyen 2014).  
Second, Germany would have to make contributions to international security and stability 
that reflect its increased international weight. Germany foreign policy must and can no longer 
flinch from this task: ‘Germany is too big to comment on world politics only from the side 
lines’ (Steinmeier 2014b). The discourse takes up the international criticism of Germany as ‘a 
spectator of global affairs’ (Gauck 2013) and ‘the shirker in the international community’ 
 
 
(Gauck 2014) and acknowledges that German foreign policy must accept more 
responsibilities (Steinmeier 2015), taking on a greater share of the burden in the transatlantic 
alliance (von der Leyen 2014). Germany is prepared to ‘accept responsibility, and to assume 
leadership’ (Federal Government 2016, 23) and to engage itself ‘earlier, more decisively and 
more substantially in foreign and security policy’ (Steinmeier 2014b). 
Third, the rationale for a more active role of Germany in international affairs ties in with 
previous shifts in the German post-unification foreign policy debate since the late 1990s (see 
Hellmann et al. 2007). This is the case, in particular, for the relevance of German history and 
the changing meaning of Germany’s responsibility for its foreign policy. Germany’s past and 
its responsibility for World War II and the Holocaust have become ever less accepted as a 
valid argument against a greater German involvement in international politics. To the 
contrary, according to Joachim Gauck (2013), the question that puts itself is whether 
Germany is not using its past as a pretext to evade its responsibilities in dealing with 
international crises. Germany’s culture of restraint as a lesson learned from its history, in the 
words of Frank-Walter Steinmeier (2014b) should not become a ‘culture of remaining on the 
sidelines’. While references to German responsibilities were primarily used to emphasise the 
limits on German foreign policy before the end of the Cold War, they since tend to carry a 
different connotation that supports the case for a stronger role of Germany in international 
politics (Crossley-Frolick 2016, 2-3). Along these lines, Germany’s ‘new power’ on the 
international stage also brings ‘new responsibility’ (SWP/GMF 2013).  
Fourth, the discourse for a more active participation of Germany in international politics is 
being complemented with assurances that German foreign policy will still hold on to its tried 
and tested foundations. In this way, the discourse confirms certain limits and conditions for a 
stronger international engagement of Germany and substantiates how German foreign policy 
should exercise its responsibilities. In particular, this comes in the shape of commitments to 
 
 
multilateralism and international cooperation. In an interconnected world, ‘responsibility is 
always shared responsibility’ (Gauck 2014) and the strengthening of multilateral institutions 
remains a priority of German foreign policy (Steinmeier 2015). In this context, special 
emphasis is put on Germany’s European vocation. Thus, international expectations that are 
directed at Germany need to be embraced in a European framework (Steinmeier 2014a, 11-
12), and German foreign policy should be an ‘instigator’ (Steinmeier 2014b) of a common 
European foreign, security and defence policy. Germany would continue to be guided by its 
‘European instincts’ (Steinmeier 2016, 113). Moreover, the discourse foregrounds that while 
German foreign policy does not rule out the use of military force in principle, it continues to 
see this only as ‘the most extreme means’ the use of which ‘requires restraint’ (Steinmeier 
2014b). When, as a ‘last resort’, deployments of the Bundeswehr need to be considered, 
‘Germany should not say “no” on principle. Nor should it say “yes” unthinkingly’ (Gauck 
2014).  
All things considered, the tenure of the Grand Coalition has witnessed a remarkable shift in 
the foreign policy discourse of leading German decision-makers. This shift was 
complemented by a comprehensive foreign policy review which foreign minister Steinmeier 
initiated in December 2013 and which was aimed at starting a ‘mature, enlightened discourse’ 
with the broader public about ‘the level of responsibility’ Germany should take on in 
international afairs (Steinmeier 2014a, 5). To this purpose, the German Federal Foreign 
Office (2014) conducted numerous discussion meetings with national and international 
foreign policy experts as well as citizens. The ‘Review 2014’ thus responded to the criticism, 
which experts reiterated during the review itself, that German foreign policy has in the past 
done too little to communicate and explain its objectives in the public domain. This has been 
blamed for the increasing disconnect between rising international expectations on German 
foreign policy and the widespread rejection of a stronger international engagement of 
 
 
Germany in the general public. A more active and reliable German foreign policy is said to 
be held back precisely by such lack of public backing (Federal Foreign Office 2014, 20-21). 
The review documented a broad consensus among the participating experts for a more active 
German foreign policy and, in particular, a German leadership role in Europe (Federal 
Foreign Office 2014, 24-25). In this sense, the ‘Review 2014’ reflected the overall shift in the 
German foreign policy discourse and contributed to its broader entrenchment in public debate. 
However, the arguments of political elites and experts continued to be met with scepticism in 
German public opinion. As a case in point, only 37 and 40 per cent of respondents to opinion 
polls in 2014 and 2015 agreed that Germany should accept more responsibilities in 
international crises, while 60 and 55 per cent disagreed. Compared to the early post-Cold War 
years, when 62 per cent of respondents to a 1994 poll were in favour of Germany taking on 
greater international responsibilities, support for a more active German foreign policy in the 
general public has thus declined (Körber-Stiftung 2014, 2-3, 2015, 1-2). The German public 
remains particularly sceptical towards foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr, which 82 per 
cent of Germans wanted to see reduced in 2014. In contrast, majorities in public opinion 
support a stronger civilian engagement of Germany in international affairs, for example in the 
form of humanitarian aid or diplomatic assistance (Körber-Stiftung 2014, 5).  
The mismatch between the foreign policy views of decision-makers and the general public 
has thus become bigger, not smaller during Angela Merkel’s third term in office. As a 
consequence, the scope for foreign policy issues to become politicised in the party political 
arena has increased further, both between the coalition partners and, in particular, between 
government and opposition parties (Brummer and Oppermann 2016, 16-19). This longer-term 
trend was reinforced over the period in office of the Grand Coalition, most notably through 
the rise of the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) which has positioned itself 
in opposition to the government on European policy and the refugee crisis as well as on 
 
 
Germany’s policy towards Russia and its defence and development policies (Alternative für 
Deutschland 2017, 25-29). On the other side of the political spectrum, the Left Party accuses 
the government of ‘great power politics’, opposes Bundeswehr operations abroad as a matter 
of principle and demands an end to the ‘German hegemony’ in the EU, in particular in the 
Eurocrisis (Die Linke 2017). Thus, relevant parties on both ends of the German party system 
seek to mobilise, in different ways, public reservations against the established foreign policy 
mainstream. This holds particular promise when international crises push foreign policy 
issues to the top of the political agenda as was often the case during the third Merkel 
government. 
In summary, the antagonism in the German foreign policy debate between an emerging elite 
consensus that Germany should assume more responsibilities in international politics and the 
questioning of this consensus in large parts of the German public and at the margins of the 
party political spectrum has continued to deepen during Angela Merkel’s third term in office. 
These two conflicting trends reinforce each other in that the changing elite discourse 
provokes the mobilization of societal and political opposition to a more active role of 
Germany on the international stage which, in turn, increases the pressure on foreign policy 
decision-makers to make the case for such a role in the domestic political arena. 
 
European Integration in Crisis: The Euro and Brexit 
During the Grand Coalition, German foreign policy was confronted with two existential 
crises in European integration (see also Wendler, this special issue). First, the Eurozone crisis 
remained unresolved and heated up again in 2015. Second, the January 2013 announcement 
of a referendum on Britain’s EU membership and the British vote to leave the EU in June 
2016 put into question the relationship between Britain and the EU and the future of the 
 
 
integration process itself. In both cases, the European and international expectations were that 
Germany would play a leading role in resolving the crises.  
Germany’s policy towards the Eurocrisis was from the beginning a difficult balancing act 
between international expectations and domestic constraints. On one hand, Germany’s 
economic strength made it the main target for international demands to provide leadership in 
overcoming the crisis (Paterson 2011, 72-74). On the other, the German government’s 
domestic room for maneuvre was closely circumscribed by a highliy mobilised public 
opinion which did not want Germany to take over significant financial costs and risks. How 
Germany should respond to the developing crisis was also strongly contested within and 
between political parties (Oppermann 2012, 510-513). In consequence, the German 
government was initially very reluctant in dealing with the crisis, for example when it for a 
while resisted a rescue package for Greece in 2009 (Schoeller 2017, 7-9).  
On the international level, this half-hearted approach earned Germany the reproach that it has 
worsened the crisis and failed to live up to its status as Europe’s leading economic power 
(Jones 2010, 21-22). Over the course of the crisis, German foreign policy felt constrained to 
become ever more involved in managing the crisis and, more by default than by design, 
gradually assumed a leadership role (Bulmer and Paterson 2016, 47-48). At the same time, 
the German approach remained strongly driven by domestic constraints and expectations. 
Most notably, the German government put the blame for the crisis squarely on the over-
indebtedness of countries at the periphery of the Eurozone and argued that the only way out 
of the crisis therefore involved strict fiscal discipline, austerity and structural reforms in these 
countries (Miskimmon and Hertner 2015, 48-54).  
The rigid German insistence on such a prescription came under often heavy criticism on the 
European level, both politically and economically (Matthijs and Blyth 2011). This came to a 
head again in the debate over a third rescue package for Greece in July 2015. At that time, the 
 
 
political and economic situation in Greece escalated when the country under the newly 
elected government of Prime Minister Alexis Tsirpas did not honour a commitment to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and rejected a reform package agreed with the Troika – 
the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF – in a referendum. 
Largely due to German pressure, however, the EU held on to its demands for wide-ranging 
austerity measures as a precondition for additional aid payments. To underline these demands, 
the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, threatened Greece with a ‘time-out’ from 
the Eurozone should its government not touch up its reform proposals (FAZ, July 11, 2015). 
Ultimately, the Tsirpas government had little choice but to bow to European pressure which 
paved the way for the rescue package to be agreed and disbursed. 
While the hard line of the German government was widely applauded domestically, the 
international response was in part highly critical (Hellmann 2016, 8). In Greece, more than 
anywhere else, the European demands for austerity led to severe social dislocations (Höpner 
2015, 239). At the same time, any conceivable alternative to the policy of the Troika which 
would not have involved a Greek exit from the Eurozone, namely permanent transfer 
payments to Greece or an inflationary policy in Germany (see Höpner 2015), were anathema 
to the German government if only for domestic political reasons. In any case, the discussions 
around the third rescue package for Greece exemplify that the Eurocrisis remained a delicate 
tightrope walk for German foreign policy between domestic constraints and European 
expectations also during the third Merkel government. Although the initial German 
reluctance in the crisis had at the time of the Grand Coalition long given way to a clear claim 
to leadership, the German approach was still largely marked by the primacy of domestic 
politics. In other European countries, Germany’s leadership role in the Eurocrisis was 
therefore for the most part not seen as a welcome example of Germany accepting more 
 
 
international responsibility, but rather stoked resentment against a German hegemony in 
Europe (Bulmer and Paterson 2016, 49-50; Giddens 2014, 8-9). 
Not dissimilar to the Eurocrisis, Germany is also central to the European response to Brexit. 
From the British side, the expectation was that its concerns would fall on comparable 
sympathetic ears in Berlin and that Germany would take a mediating position between the EU 
and the UK. This was already noticeable during the attempts of Prime Minister David 
Cameron to renegotiate Britain’s terms of EU membership (Oppermann 2016, 522-525). 
Since the referendum, a widespread British expectation is that German business interests will 
make the German government accommodate Britain’s demand for continued full access to 
the European single market after the country has left the EU (Galpin 2016). 
To all intents and purposes, these British hopes have not materialised. Rather, the main 
German priority in the Brexit discussions has been to maintain the integrity of the single 
market and to avoid the disintegration of the EU. To this purpose, Germany opposes any 
bespoke deals and special arrangements for Britain but insists on strict compliance with 
European rules. The German government and Angela Merkel personally have taken the lead 
in coordinating the positions of the remaining 27 member states to ensure a unified European 
approach. The Grand Coalition has made an effort to consult widely with other EU members 
and to support the special priorities of particular countries, most notably Ireland. For 
Chancellor Merkel, it was important ‘to listen to many in the EU’ and to enter into ‘a phase 
of listening, understanding and learning from each other’ (Bundeskanzleramt 2016).  
As a result, the German government has made a substantial contribution to the clear-cut 
course of the EU in the Brexit discussions so far. This was the case, for example, for the 
European refusal to enter into talks before the British government had triggered article 50 of 
the Lisbon Treaty or with regard to the sequencing of the negotiations. Together with France, 
Germany has also taken the initiative to develop proposals for the future development and 
 
 
further deepening of European integration after Britain has left the EU. Within days of the 
referendum, the German and French foreign ministers, Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Jean-
Marc Ayrault, presented a joint paper in which they commit to ‘move further towards 
political union in Europe’ putting forward a ‘shared vision of Europe as a security union’. 
The other European states were invited ‘to join us in this endeavour’ (Ayrault and Steinmeier 
2016).  
Germany’s leadership role in the Brexit debate was facilitated by the absence of strong 
domestic constraints. In the party political arena, the government approach enjoyed broad 
cross-party support from CDU/CSU, SPD and the Greens. The positions of Left Party and 
AfD remained diffuse and were not strongly articulated in public discourse. The issue was 
also not a priority for public opinion and was largely absent from the 2017 general election 
campaign. Most notably, the government has from the start closely involved business 
representatives in its deliberations and decision-making.1 This has succeeded in aligning in 
particular the German car industry and the leading business associations with the government 
position that the protection of the single market must have priority over Germany’s future 
trading relations with Britain (Observer, July 9, 2017). Unlike in the Eurocrisis, the German 
government did thus not have to make allowances for strong domestic political restrictions 
and was able to put its European policy objectives front and centre of its approach to Brexit. 
 
Security Crises: Ukraine and Syria 
The commitments of German foreign policy decision-makers to a more active role of 
Germany in international politics was put to the test in the diplomatic and military crisis in 
Eastern Ukraine. The starting point of the crisis was the announcement of the Ukrainian 
government under President Yanukovych in November 2013 that it would not sign an 
association agreement with the EU and the following mass protests which culminated in 
 
 
violent clashes between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian sympathisers with many casualties in 
February 2014. The situation escalated in particular in Eastern Ukraine which became the site 
of an armed conflict between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian forces. The crisis 
came to a head with the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014. The two Minsk 
agreements of September 2014 and February 2015 have established a truce between the two 
sides which remains fragile, however. 
The international expectations on German foreign policy in this crisis were high from the 
outset. Most notably, the US administration under President Barack Obama left the leadership 
of diplomatic efforts to defuse the conflict largely to the German government. The lack of 
British engagement further added to the gap in international crisis management which 
German foreign policy was expected to fill (Giegerich and Terhalle 2016, 157-158). Germany 
appeared predestined for this role not least because of its geopolitical location which made it 
vulnerable to any instability caused by the conflict. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, in 
particular, came as a ‘strategic shock’ (Kundnani 2015, 108) to Germany. Moreover, 
Germany was better able than other European countries to draw on existing contacts and 
diplomatic channels to the two conflict parties thanks to its close political and economic 
relations to both Russia and Ukraine (Steinmeier 2016, 112). In any event, Germany’s efforts 
were widely judged favourably (Hellmann 2016, 8). The Grand Coalition was credited with a 
‘strong sense of resolve and responsibility’ (Hyde-Price 2015, 610) and Chancellor Merkel 
was applauded for having ‘played an impressive role’ (Pond 2015, 173).  
Germany’s approach to the conflict rested on three pillars. First, German foreign policy sided 
unequivocally against Russia. Thus, Chancellor Merkel left no doubt that Russia’s actions in 
Eastern Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea ‘clearly constitute a violation of basic 
principles under international law’ (Merkel 2014). In practical terms, Germany supported 
economic sanctions against Russia and argued that such sanctions should only be lifted in 
 
 
return for a full implementation of the second Minsk agreement (Fix 2016). In view of 
Germany’s tradition of Ostpolitik and its economic interests in Russia, this hard line against 
Russia caught many observers by surprise (Kundnani 2015). 
Second, the German government took on a central role in multilateral crisis diplomacy. 
Notably, German initiatives, in close consultation with France, were decisive for the two 
Minsk agreements. In the process, German foreign policy has been careful to coordinate its 
positions with the US and its partners in the EU, G7 and OSCE (see Merkel 2014). It has 
avoided passing over other EU members (Hellmann 2016, 7-8) and was instrumental in 
agreeing and maintaining a common EU position on sanctions against Russia (Hyde-Price 
2015, 609).  
Third, German foreign policy endeavoured to keep up its dialogue with the Russian 
government. This was guided by the belief that Russia would have to be reintegrated into the 
European security architecture after the conflict had been resolved. The German experience 
was, in Steinmeier’s (2015) words, ‘that there can only ever be lasting security in Europe 
with and not against Russia’. Along these lines, Chancellor Merkel stood out as the foremost 
international interlocutor of President Putin, and foreign minister Steinmeier kept in constant 
touch with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov (Forsberg 2016, 30). 
Turning to the domestic arena, the government approach did not go uncontested. Rather, its 
strong position against Russia and the question of sanctions raised objections from different 
quarters. In the final analysis, however, German foreign policy was not in any meaningful 
way shaped by domestic constraints, because the Grand Coalition was able to pass over or 
neutralise reservations about its policy. That was the case, for example, for a range of voices 
from within the SPD, including former Chancellors Gerhard Schröder and Helmut Schmidt, 
which argued for a more comprmise-oriented approach to Russia. Open letters which were 
signed by politicians, intellectuals and other public figures across the political spectrum 
 
 
articulated similar views (see Die Zeit, December 5, 2014). Foreign minister Steinmeier, 
however, although himself an advocate of Ostpolitik, did not embrace this standpoint but 
pursued a policy that combined a hard line against Russia with a readiness to engage in 
dialogue (Forsberg 2016, 31-37). 
As for the broader public, the government line came to be endorsed by clear majorities over 
the course of the conflict. While public opinion was initially mixed, the downing of a 
Malaysia Airlines passenger aircraft over Eastern Ukraine on 17 July 2014, presumably by 
pro-Russian separatists, did a lot to shift public attitudes against Russia. Whereas 49 per cent 
of Germans still wanted the government to act as a neutral mediator in the conflict in March 
2914, the policy of the Grand Coalition had the support of a majority of 61 per cent already in 
December 2014 (Pond 2015). In November 2014, 58 per cent of Germans were in favour of 
economic sanctions against Russia and 76 per cent thought the accusations of the German 
government against Russia were justified (ZDF 2014). In contrast to the Eurocrisis, public 
opinion did thus not emerge as a significant constraint on German foreign policy. 
Even more importantly, perhaps, the German government was also able to get large parts of 
German business on its side. While the German Committee on Eastern European Economic 
Relations and large businesses with significant investments in Russia were predictably 
critical of economic santions against Russia (Fix 2016, 3; Kundnani 2015, 112-113), other 
representatives of German business accepted the primacy of longer-term security interests 
over shorter-term economic motives and increasingly came to back the imposition of 
sanctions (Forsberg 2016, 34; Pond 2015). German foreign policy did thus not come under 
sustained pressure from the side of German business and industry. 
Against this background, the Ukraine crisis stands out as the most notable example during the 
third Merkel government in which German foreign policy was able to meet international 
demands for a more active German contribution on the international stage and to win 
 
 
domestic support for such a course. In comparison, German foreign policy played a much 
lesser role in the second major security crisis during the tenure of the Grand Coalition, the 
conflict in Syria. At the same time, it should be noted that the German government has 
gradually involved itself more in international diplomatic efforts around that conflict as well.  
The main case in point is that Germany has agreed in January 2014 to meet a UN request to 
participate in the destruction of chemical weapons of the Assad regime which were brought 
out of Syria under an agreement brokered by the US and Russia. This reversed the position of 
the second Merkel government which had declined such a contribution due to the 
reservations of foreign minister Westerwelle (Hyde-Price 2015, 602-605). Over the summer 
of 2014, moreover, the Grand Coalition decided to support the Kurdish Peshmerga in 
northern Iraq with weapons and ammunition. This breaks with an established principle of 
German foreign policy not to deliver military equipment into conflict regions (Giegerich and 
Terhalle 2016, 160). On a French request after the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015, 
finally, Germany assists the airstrikes of its western allies against so-called Islamic State (IS) 
in Syria and Iraq with Tornado reconnaissance flights and a frigate of the German Navy. 
However, such contributions sit uneasily with a large majority in German public opinion, 82 
per cent of which opposed Germany’s participation in a military intervention in the conflict in 
October 2015 (Körber-Stiftung 2015, 16). If anything, this serves as a reminder that even a 
relatively minor military engagement in Syria remains a difficult domestic political balancing 
act for German foreign policy. 
 
The Refugee Crisis 
The decision of the Grand Coalition in early September 2015 to let refugees who were 
stranded in Hungary into Germany to apply for asylum stands in contrast to the caution and 
careful weighing of options with which German foreign policy, in particular under 
 
 
Chancellor Merkel, is often associated. Rather, international observers widely praised Angela 
Merkel for her ‘moral leadership’ (New York Times, 5 September, 2015) in this humanitarian 
crisis. Given the perceived time pressure, however, the Merkel government acted without 
broader multilateral consultations with its European partners and did not foresee the wider 
domestic political repercussions of its policy. In consequence, the German approach to the 
refugee crisis increasingly came under pressure from two sides.  
On the European level, the German government failed to bring about agreement among EU 
member states on a common response to the crisis. Central and eastern European EU 
members, in particular, resisted plans from the European Commission for a quota system to 
distribute refugees across the EU which the Merkel government had supported. Rather, 
Germany was accused of misusing the European institutions for its own national interests and 
of disregarding the Dublin II Regulation under which asylum applications must be examined 
in the member state where refugees have first entered the EU. The attempt at German 
leadership in the crisis thus foundered on the lack of followership in the EU (Bulmer and 
Paterson 2016, 50-51). 
At the same time, the Grand Coalition also was in a tight corner domestically. The initial 
‘welcoming culture’ towards the refugees increasingly gave way to public rejection. Already 
in October 2015, 69 per cent of Germans were dissatisfied with the refugee policy of the 
government (Infratest Dimap 2015). What is more, 45 per cent of respondents saw the issue 
as the greatest challenge for German foreign policy. In the eyes of the German public, the 
refugee crisis stood out as the single most important foreign policy problem facing Germany, 
far ahead of the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine (Körber-Stiftung 2015, 9). In the party 
political arena, the issue more than anything mobilised growing support for the AfD and led 
to public divisions inside the coalition, in particular between CDU and CSU. German foreign 
 
 
policy was thus under strong domestic pressure to achieve a decrease in the number of 
refugees coming to Germany. 
To this purpose, the German government was a key advocate of the March 2016 EU-Turkey 
agreement in which Turkey pledges to improve its border protection and to bar refugees from 
entering the EU. In return, the EU committed to assist the integration of refugees in Turkey 
with six billion Euros and held out the prospect of liberalizing visa requirements for Turkish 
citizens and of moving forward with Turkey’s EU accession process. While the agreement 
has indeed contributed to a sharp decline in the number of refugees reaching Greece from 
Turkey as was the intention of the Merkel government (Die Zeit, February 2, 2017), the deal 
has come under heavy international criticism with a view to the living conditions of the 
refugees and human rights violations in Turkey (Amnesty International 2017). Moreover, it 
has been suggested that the agreement makes the German government susceptible to Turkish 
blackmail (FAZ, May 15, 2016). Altogether, the refugee crisis stands for the limits of German 
influence in the EU and the close interplay between foreign policy decisions and German 
domestic politics. 
 
Transatlantic Relations and NATO 
The growing international expectations on German foreign policy also came into focus with 
regard to Germany’s relationship with the US and its role in NATO. This was because 
President Trump hardened America’s stance towards its European allies and toughened up 
US demands for a fairer burden sharing in NATO. In particular, the Trump administration 
threatened to scale back America’s engagement in NATO should Germany and other NATO 
members not meet the agreed target to spend two per cent of their gross domestic product on 
defence by 2024.  
 
 
Although the precise meaning and binding nature of the two per cent target were judged 
differently by the coalition partners, the German government pledged to ‘improve the burden 
sharing imbalance’ (von der Leyen 2014) in the alliance. It worked on the assumption that the 
US would further ratchet up its demand for such a contribution and that the future of the 
transatlantic security community would increasingly depend on the willingness of NATO 
members to ‘shoulder a larger share of the common burden’ (Federal Government 2016, 31). 
Along these lines, the medium-term fiscal planning of the German government provides for 
an increase of the defence budget from 37 to 42.4 billion Euros by 2021. While this would 
still only amount to 1.3 per cent of the German gross domestic product, the planned spending 
increases put Germany on track to meeting another NATO target according to which member 
states should spend 20 per cent of its defence budget on military investments by 2020 (Glatz 
and Zapfe 2017, 6-7). 
Furthermore, the German defence ministry has started to align its national capability planning 
more with NATO’s strategic guidelines than in the past. In particular, the focus has shifted 
from crisis management back to collective defence aiming to make the Bundeswehr a key 
pillar of the European defence capability within NATO. In the context of the NATO 
Framework Nations Concept that was initiated by Germany, the Bundeswehr accepts leading 
responsibilities for the coordinated development of the capabilities of the participating 
countries (Glatz and Zapfe 2017, 2-6). Also, the German government, together with the 
Netherlands and Norway, has in 2015 taken over the leadership of the Very High Readiness 
Joint Task Force that was agreed at the 2014 NATO summit in Wales. Against the backdrop 
of the Ukraine conflict, the main purpose of this task force is to improve the ability of the 
alliance to respond to possible security threats from Russia (NATO 2016). 
It has to be noted, however, that the strengthening of Germany’s engagement in NATO 
remains highly sensitive domestically. This is the case, not least, with a view to increasing 
 
 
resentments towards the US in German public opinion (Kundnani 2015, 111) and because of 
a German strategic culture that continues to be sceptical of the role of military instruments in 
security policy (Hyde-Price 2015, 612-613). As a case in point, the then-SPD candidate for 
the chancellorship, Martin Schulz, tried to score political points in the 2017 elections by 
rejecting the NATO two per cent target and by rebuffing President Trump’s demands for 
higher German defence spending (Reuters, May 31, 2017). Moreover, a stronger German 
engagement in defence policy might corroborate exisiting suspicions in the German public 
that the elite discourse about the growing responsibilities Germany should take on in 
international politics is in fact code for an increasing militarisation of German foreign policy 
(Crossley-Frolick 2016, 13-14).  
 
Conclusion 
The foreign policy record of the third Merkel government is of longer-term significance 
mainly in two respects. First, the multiple international crises it had to deal with highlight the 
growing challenges and expectations that are in store for German foreign policy in an 
increasingly fluid and uncertain international environment. Second, the tenure of the Grand 
Coalition has witnessed a significant shift in the domestic foreign policy discourse in the 
sense that German decision-makers have clearer and more emphatically than before 
committed to taking over greater international responsibilities. However, reservations against 
a stronger German engagement on the international stage persist in the broader public and in 
the party political arena. This suggests that the trend towards a stronger domestic 
politicisation of German foreign policy will further intensify. 
This tension between international and domestic expectations played out differently across 
the different crises that dominated the foreign policy agenda of the third Merkel government. 
On one hand, the Eurocisis and the refugee crisis exemplify the double bind of German 
 
 
foreign policy between tight domestic political restrictions and widespread international 
criticism. In the Brexit crisis and the Ukraine conflict, in contrast, German foreign policy did 
not have to make significant allowances for domestic considerations and was able to act in 
ways that were widely appreciated on the international level. As for the current fault lines in 
the transatlantic relationship, the jury is still out how far a stronger engagement of Germany 
in NATO will provoke domestic opposition. 
The mixed foreign policy balance sheet of the Grand Coalition suggests that the ability of 
German foreign policy to live up to its own aspirations to assume greater international 
responsibilities is shaped by the respective two-level constellation. By this measure, the more 
domestic latitude the German government has and the less international expectations conflict 
with domestic restrictions, the more successful German foreign policy will be. At the same 
time, German foreign policy will have to accustom itself to more international criticism that 
goes hand in hand with a more active role on the international stage which will not always 
correspond to the interests of its international partners. For the near future, the fragmentation 
of the German party system, the entry of the AfD into the Bundestag and the complex 
government formation after the 2017 elections indicate, generally speaking, a tightening of 
the domestic constraints and therefore a more difficult two-level context of German foreign 
policy. The task of the successor to the third Merkel government to navigate the different and 
at times conflicting demands and expectations on German foreign policy will thus not 
become any easier. 
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